In this paper, I begin with an account of the initial distinction between likenesses and appearances, a distinction which may resemble the difference between sophists and philosophers. That distinction first arises immediately after the puzzling appearance of the noble sophist, who seems to occupy an odd space in between sophist and philosopher. In the second section, I look more closely at the noble sophist, and on what that figure might tell us about images and the use of images. I also (...) attempt to use the insights provided by the noble sophist in an investigation of the kind of images that Plato the author produces. This raises the question of the general notion of image as it appears in the Sophist, and especially of the dual nature of all images, which in turn invites reflection on certain features of the examination of being and non-being late in the dialogue. Finally, I return to the deception inherent in images, and I argue that this dialogue does not present the possibility of completely honest images. Nevertheless, I hope to show that some uses of deceptions and images are better than others. (shrink)

In this paper I defend a reading of eikasia as the viewing of an image as an image; this condition need not involve any confusion of image and original. The “standard reading” of eikasia, on which experiencing this state involves mistaking images for originals, is unsatisfactory, despite the fact that it offers an attractive account of the relation of the line and the cave. The initial description of eikasia makes the suggestion that Socrates believes that anyone consistently mistakes images for (...) originals implausible. Furthermore, the similarity later described between eikasia and dianoia, the third highest state on the line, supports the claim that eikasia can sometimes involve the successful study of an object through its image. After outlining my view of eikasia and explaining these arguments against the “standard” view, I return to the cave and attempt a pairing of the line and the cave that accords with my account of eikasia. (shrink)

In an attempt to examine the notion of unstable difference in Herodotus as part of the presentation of an unstable world, this article focuses on the stories involving Atossa, Darius’ wife. In the stories of Atossa, obvious markers of difference appear, only to come into question, especially in Herodotus’ stories. Never in these stories, though, does Herodotus completely subvert the audience’s expectations of sexual or cultural difference—the differences between men and women become unstable in the stories,yet those differences do persist. (...) In presenting stories like those of Atossa, Herodotus confronts his reader with a complex and unstable world. By refusing to add artificial stability to his narrative, Herodotus allows his reader the experience of that world in all of its complexity. (shrink)

After arriving drunk (‘plastered’ in one translation) at Agathon's party, Alcibiades offers to praise Socrates instead of love, the object of the other characters' praise. In praising Socrates, Alcibiades says that he will have to use images (εἰκόνων, 215a4–5). He assures his companions, however, that this ‘is no joke: the image will be for the sake of the truth’ (ἔσται δ' ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἕνεκα, οὐ τοῦ γελοίου, 215a6). Alcibiades goes on to present his famous images of a Socrates (...) who is full of divine images (ἀγάλματα), and who casts spells with his words (λόγοι). Later, Alcibiades describes those words themselves as ‘bursting with images of virtue’ (ἀγάλματ' ἀρετῆς, 222a3–4). (shrink)

Aristotle's account of virtue faces two dangers: the account appears circular, and the text seems to suggest that virtue is relative. Virtue sets the ends for practical wisdom. Without practical wisdom, though, one lacks 'real virtue.' Virtue and practical wisdom appear to depend upon each other. Further, habituation is the source of virtue. Virtue appears to depend upon one's training; virtue looks relative. The concept of 'natural virtue' offers an escape from these difficulties. Virtue and practical wisdom, though related, are (...) not related in a vicious circle. Further, 'natural virtue' guarantees that Aristotle's virtue is not relativistic. (shrink)